H ow do we know what we know in qualitative inquiry? It is the subjectivity of analysis that bothers our quantitative colleagues, who have learned the hard way never to overclaim, or even gloat over, a suggestion not quite a fact in their data. I recall listening to Jane Goodall telling a story about when she was a student in Cambridge, trying to explain to her research colleagues that one of her beloved chimpanzee infants was jealous. She was told that she could not say that, because she could not possibly know that a chimpanzee felt jealousy, and such anthropomorphisms were not permitted in ethology. But she could reframe her statement and say something like-for these are not her exact words (and of all editorials this one must be accurately imprecise)-"But if he [the chimpanzee] was a human child, we would label these behaviors as jealous." I am relieved that, with all of her observations, Jane was not persuaded to abandon the emotional aspects and human labeling in her analyses and that, over the past few decades, ethologists have loosened a little, and now let Dr. Goodall say exactly what she means.
But the above example is important for qualitative inquiry. We spend a great deal of time describing and developing these techniques of description, but the bulk of our most significant work is interpretive. Description is pointing out the obvious and the not so obvious (until, of course, it is pointed out), but the interpretive analysis is the creative contribution of our methods, identifying the meaning in what we all see, making the trivial profound, and the obvious significant.
Accuracy in interpretation is a weighty charge, for such a license is risky. Our analysis may be wrong or even dangerous. An interpretive license could be used for a less noble cause than enlightenment; it may be used politically or deliberately distorted. I am indebted to Qualitative Health Research reviewers for their care in examining the step-by-step logic of submissions, their scrutiny of the methods used, and their conscientious examination of authors' conclusions to ensure that nothing is overclaimed. We are our own gatekeepers, and this is the way that our science works.
Certainly, it is a delicate balance between being useful and insightful, and exaggerating, "off the mark," or simply wrong. I recall a severely burned patient telling me that he had surgery for "40 and a half hours." Now I am pretty sure that he did not have surgery that lasted almost 2 days, but that is what he said. As qualitative researchers, we believe that the participants' perception-what they believe (note my language: "what they believe")-does not make the belief fact, but keeps it as a perception. So I read "surgeries that last too long to bear" when I read his transcript. Do I correct it in the quotation? No, I leave it as it is said. Does this participant lose legitimacy, and the interview lose validity? No. We could consider how this participant came to believe this as true, but that cognitive process is not important to this particular study, so I do not pursue it.
So when we do interpretive work, we use all our theoretical memories and skills, our own beliefs, values, and desires to discover something interesting and new. We are also working with the softest of soft datapeoples' recollections, beliefs, attitudes, dreams, and the human inaccuracies of recollection and altered perceptions. Trying to get it right, while looking in from the outside. These stories belong to people, to others. And we are not only limited in the interpretation, but we are also limited in our abilities to disguise and conceal identities. Unwritten and undiscussed threats to validity may be researcher respect, tact, and kindness that are deliberately distorted descriptions, but which I see as a necessary compromise to validity. Jane, I do not want to diminish the struggles you had convincing your colleagues so many years ago, but we are still having similar struggles convincing our colleagues with our human studies. Unlike your chimpanzee, our participants can usually speak and understand what we say; this communication works in both directions, and actually makes it harder for us. Unlike your chimpanzee, our participants will read what we write and hear what we present, and possibly they will not like what they read and what they hear-our interpretation of their experiences-even if it is right.
